had also become, as had China and Hong Kong, a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which in 1994 launched a plan to create a 'free trade and investment zone' by between 2010 and 2020. Thus, Taiwan's commercial interests in the region were not by this time that disadvantaged by the politico-diplomatic constraints of 'contested statehood'. This situation, though, began to change quite dramatically after the 1997/98 financial crisis, whereby the crisis itself helped catalyse significant changes to the East Asian regional political economy.
2 At a generalised level, the most important change has been the marked increase in international economic agreements between East Asian nation-states as together they have sought to better manage their regional economic interdependence in the aftermath of the crisis.
We examine the nature and scope of these agreements below, and how, as a 'contested state', Taiwan's ability to participate in East Asia's new regional political economy is somewhat limited, as is examined below. The extent to which this disadvantages Taiwan in both economic and political terms is also discussed.
The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Framework

Early Beginnings
The APT framework consists of the ten member states of ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian states of Japan, China and South Korea. It is historically significant as APT represents the first real coalescing of an East Asian economic grouping. The framework was established in December 1997 at its inaugural summit convened in Kuala Lumpur, during the height of the region's financial crisis (Stubbs 2002 , Tay 2001 , Webber 2001 . The APT was thus initially shaped in the crucible of crisis-related events, and it is therefore not surprising that its principal focus has remained fixed on issues of regional financial governance in East Asia. 2 The term 'regional political economy' is a derivative heuristic device stemming from international political economy (IPE) analysis. By regional political economy, we are thus referring to the social, political, and economic arrangements affecting a region's systems of production, exchange, and distribution and the mix of values reflected therein, thus drawing upon Strange's (1994) definition of IPE but with 'region' substituted for 'global'.
the financial crisis, Tokyo proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in
September 1997. The AMF was conceived as a standby fund of US$100bn to provide emergency financial assistance to East Asian countries whose currencies were subject to disruptive speculative pressures. Taiwan also backed this Japanese initiative, whereby the two offered to pool their considerable foreign exchange reserves in order to operationalise the AMF. However, the US opposed to the idea because of concern over how the AMF would undermine the multilateral competence of the IMF, and hence indirectly lead to a loss of American structural power and influence over the international financial system (Rapkin 2001 ).
This was despite Japan's argument that the AMF would be a new facility to provide additional resources to supplement those of the IMF, if required. China was against the AMF proposal too, mainly because of Taiwan's involvement but also owing to this perceived hegemonic manoeuvring of Japan's within the East Asian regional political economy. 3 Consequently, other East Asian states proved reluctant in backing the AMF initiative.
While this first attempt at developing regional financial governance mechanisms in East Asia failed, other more acceptable proposals from Japan followed, and this whole process was to later converge with the APT process. In October 1998, Japan unilaterally launched its New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI, named after Japan's then finance minister), which was primarily based on US$30 billion of extended liquidity provision for East Asian economies if they again found themselves in financial crisis. Other APT member states generally welcomed the NMI and other related initiatives from Japan, such as the US$5 billion Special Yen Loan Facility, especially after how the crisis had by this time revealed the IMF's failures and inadequacies in dealing with the region's financial problems (Hughes 2000) . Moreover, the NMI both provided a foundation stone for later developments in East Asian financial co-operation, as well as helped catalyse discussions on regional finance at the second APT summit, convened at Hanoi A few months later at the Fourth APT summit held in November 2000 at Singapore, East Asian leaders formally endorsed the CMI plan, which essentially constituted a more regional approach to averting another financial crisis. At its centre are a series of bilateral currency swap agreements between APT member states. A currency swap is an agreement to exchange one currency for another and to reverse the transaction at some later date. The idea here is for harder currencies (e.g. dollars, yen, euros) to be initially swapped for softer local currencies facing severe speculative pressure in the markets, thus providing a counter-pressure mechanism to help stabilise the exchange rate of that local currency. The CMI is accompanied by a number of other supportive or related arrangements, namely: (i) an agreement to exchange information on short-term capital movements in East Asia, including the establishment of an early warning system to monitor signs of emergent financial crises; (ii) the exchange of views among APT members on reforming the international financial architecture; (iii) regularised meetings between deputy or vice-ministers of finance to review all CMI-related developments. As Ravenhill (2002) is keen to point out, the CMI is not an 'AMF mark II' because it rests upon a combination of bilateral agreements rather than the creation of a regional institution. Moreover, the liquidity provision involved is nowhere near as large as that proposed under the ill-fated AMF. Within the CMI, the core ASEAN economies agreed to raise their contributions to their own pre-existing ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA) facility from a total of US$200 million to US$1 billion. 4 Additional currency swap deals were initiated across APT's wider membership, with a total of 13 bilateral arrangements signed by April 2004 (Figure 1 ). Taken together with the ASA, these currency deals amounted to US$33 billion. This represents a mere fraction of the combined foreign exchange reserves at the disposal of East Asian states that together would total at around US$1.5 trillion, which represents 60 percent of the world total. 5 It was generally accepted that such low swap arrangement sums were likely to prove insufficient to fend off a major speculative 'attack' on an unstable currency (Chalongphob 2002 There are a number of possible reasons why the CMI did not at this early stage involve more ambitious levels of currency swap funding. Firstly, there are competing demands upon East
Asian forex reserves, and substantial shares of them may be tied up elsewhere. 7 Secondly, it was more politically expedient for the CMI to start with relatively small sums at the outset.
What was more important at this point was the initial trust-building exercise that the CMI represented. Following on from this is the third main reason, which relates to lessons learnt from the AMF episode. The APT member states were wary of the CMI being perceived as a challenge to the IMF's multilateral competence, and therein posing a threat to US foreign economic policy interests. Not only may the relatively small sums involved in the bilateral currency swap agreements be partly intended to allay any AMF-related anxieties, but also more importantly operationalising the agreements themselves are subject to IMF conditionality.
Under current CMI arrangements, only 10 percent of the initial swap arrangements can be released unconditionally: thereafter beneficiaries must reach agreement with the IMF on a programme of economic reforms before further assistance is conferred.
Notwithstanding the limited regional ambition demonstrated by the CMI in its first phase, it nevertheless marked a significant step forward in East Asian financial co-operation, not least because of the almost complete lack to region-wide co-operation in this field before the 1997/98 crisis (ADB 2004 , Henning 2002 owing to the rapid deterioration of the balance sheets of borrowers and financial institutions.
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This was one of the transmission mechanisms that triggered East Asia's financial crisis in July and August 1997.
Like the CMI, the ABMI provides East Asia with the opportunity to utilise the region's huge financial resources for promoting its own regional financial stability and economic development, rather than investing in, or diverting these resources to other regions.
Furthermore, as one financial analyst remarked, "People in Asia want to reduce their exposure to the dollar but there is nowhere to go. China is looking at the euro, as an alternative to the states may find it difficult to resist such American pressure, but an East Asian regional group with its combined financial resources would not. The fact that the APT group hold more 60 percent of the world's foreign exchange reserves and yet hold less than 13 percent of the quotas in the IMF -to which voting shares are closely tied -creates further incentive for strengthening East Asia's own regional powers of financial self-determination. In the meantime, the ASEAN Plus Three group will remain 'Asia Minus Taiwan' whilst China maintains its opposition to Taiwan membership as a separate political entity. However, the same "two regions, one country" principle was being offered, which was unacceptable to Taipei. 43 While there exists some support amongst Taiwan's business community for a conventional FTA with China, as part of liberalising the restrictions on CrossStrait commerce, the Taiwanese Government would be reluctant to sign an FTA with Beijing for reasons of economic and national security (Dent 2001 
Taiwan's Prospects in East Asia's New Regional Political Economy
What, then, are Taiwan's prospects in the new regional political economy of East Asia? Taipei has been aware of how both FTA and APT processes have the potential to marginalise Taiwan if it is not able to effectively engage in their respective integrational developments. While it has been able to participate in the new bilateral FTA trend (but not the APT framework), little progress has been achieved thus far on this front, and convincing key trade partners to sign It has already it has made more progress than most commentators were predicting even a few years ago, and there is a strong chance that the APT could lay the foundation for an EU-style regional integration bloc in East Asia. Aside from efforts at fortifying regional financial governance, there are other notable initiatives to emerge within the framework. This includes projects on promoting small and medium-sized enterprises, the provision of training courses on using environmental technologies, the APT Natural Gas forum, annual APT Ministerial
Meetings (e.g. Economic, Labour), discussions on food security issues, and various other programmes such as APT Young Leaders and the e-APT Working Group. In terms of overall practical achievement, the APT framework has thus made advances in regional co-operation rather than integration. Ideas on how to proceed to the latter have, though, been proposed at recent APT summits. For example, there has been talk of creating an East Asian Free Trade Area or Zone, common market and even full monetary union.
These are bold objectives for a young regional framework like APT to aspire. Yet East Asia's leaders understand that these are extremely long-term goals. As Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji commented at the November 2000 in Singapore, APT is a channel through which to "gradually establish a framework for regional financial, trade and investment co-operation, and furthermore to realise still greater regional economic integration in a step by step manner." 46 It is also worth noting that in the EU's antecedent founding Treaty of Rome of 1957 lay the longterm vision of one day establishing a European common market. The point here is that while over-ambitious objectives can prove counter-productive -especially if scheduled deadlines for realising them are missed -longer-term goals provide critical direction and purpose to a regional framework.
There is also the issue of how certain APT processes and the new FTA trend may become increasingly conflated. Already we have seen how the APT framework has helped facilitate the development of bilateral FTA projects between East Asian states, as well as become the natural forum to discuss regional trade integration. On the first of these matters, China and the ASEAN group used APT in every stage of the development of their ACFTA project: agreement on launching a joint feasibility study was announced at APT's 2000 summit at Singapore; a year later at the 2001 summit in Brunei, both sides came to a general agreement about the terms of the FTA; finally, at the 2002 summit in Phnom Penh, the ASEAN-China FTA was formally signed. A feasibility study into establishing an EAFTA has been conducted, although the report stated this was, "a long-term goal", and should "take into account the variety of differences in 46 International Herald Tribune, 27.11.2000. developmental stages and the varied interests of the countries in the region." 47 Taiwan's omission from such a project, if it ever were to be initiated, could have serious political and economic consequences for the island's long-term future. Regarding the APT framework, Taiwan's non-participation could be problematic if it eventually develops into a more substantial regional integration arrangement. Being outside such an emerging regional bloc would be disadvantageous in both political and economic terms. It would not bode well for East Asia's fourth economy to be sidelined in any new systems of regional economic governance that develop over forthcoming years. Taiwan must hope that its politico-economic interests will not be outpaced by these new developments in East Asian regional economic relations, and that it new opportunities for engaging in them will arise over time. 
Conclusion
Important new developments in East
